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Note
Striking a Balance:
Revising USDA Regulations to Promote
Competition Without Stifling Innovation
Amanda Welters*
Genetically modified organisms. For some, these words
may conjure images of Frankenstein and wild-haired scientists
modifying living things with reckless abandon.1 For others, the
image is of teams of scientists synthesizing forward-thinking
science in an attempt to enhance an organism’s potential.
These scientists have changed the world of agriculture as
crops—like soybeans—are modified for improved performance.
In 2014, the agriculture industry will be facing for the first
time the expiration of a patent for an enormously popular
crop—Roundup Ready soybeans. “While the pharmaceutical industry has the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 to tell its players
exactly how to transition seamlessly from patent monopolies to
generic competition, agricultural biotech has no equivalent.”2
In 2010, 93 percent of soybeans planted in the United
© 2012 Amanda Welters
* Law student at the University of Minnesota Law School. The author would
like to give a big thank you to her dad, Roger Olson, as he was the original inspiration for this Note. The author would also like to give many thanks to Professor Ralph Hall for his guidance throughout the writing process.
1. See, e.g., Yann Devos et al., Ethics in the Societal Debate on Genetically
Modified Organisms: (Re)Quest for Sense and Sensibility, 21 J. AGRIC. &
ENVTL. ETHICS 29, 33 (2008), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content
/h8322712ng142735/fulltext.pdf.
2. Roger Parloff, Monsanto’s Seeds of Discord: Full Version, FORTUNE
500 (May 11, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/06/news/comp
anies/monsanto_patent_full.fortune/index.htm. But see Andrew A. Caffrey, III
& Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and Procedure: Generic
Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA J. L.
& TECH. 1, 28 (2004) (illustrating that the transition to generics in the pharmaceutical industry was not so “seamless” with an FTC study that showed the
Hatch-Waxman Act resulted in increased litigation and extended patent
stays).
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States were herbicide-resistant.3 This percentage is largely attributable to one company—Monsanto—with its Roundup
Ready (RR) soybeans.4 Since Monsanto first introduced its RR
soybean in 1996,5 the company has enjoyed a strong hold on the
soybean market.6 Monsanto’s patent on the RR technology expires in 2014, which will enable companies to begin manufacturing a generic version of the RR soybean.7 Current legislation, however, cannot adequately oversee the transition to the
generic use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible
for overseeing the regulation of GMOs—like RR soybeans.8 Recent court cases questioning the USDA’s effectiveness in overseeing name brand GMOs raises concerns over the USDA’s
ability to monitor generic GMOs.9 Moreover, legislation is
needed to ensure the availability of generic GMOs as name
brand manufacturers like Monsanto attempt to use patent protections to slow the emergence of generic versions.10

3. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERVICES, AGRIC. STAT. BOARD, ACREAGE 25
(2010), available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/Acre/Acre-0630-2010.pdf.
4. Alison Fitzgerald, Monsanto 7-State Probe Threatens Profit from 93%
(Mar.
10,
2010,
12:01
AM),
Soybean
Share,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aCK4Q3XZCpy.
5. Jennifer M. Latzke, Roundup Ready Soybean Trait Nears Expiration
in 2014, HIGH PLAINS/MIDWEST AG J., at 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2010/aug10/aug2/0716SeedMACOAug2sr.cfm.
6. See Monsanto, the Government, Monopoly Claims, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/food-inc/Pages/monsanto-revolving-door.aspx (last
visited Aug. 28, 2011) (recognizing that the majority of soybeans planted contain the Roundup Ready gene); see also Jack Kaskey, Monsanto’s Roundup
Ready Soybeans Probed by Justice (Update4), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2010, 5:09
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.17Be
OtaDpU (examining the U.S. Justice Department’s probe into possible anticompetitive practices by Monsanto).
7. Kaskey, supra note 6.
8. See Frequently Asked Questions About Biotechnology, U.S. DEPT. OF
AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=Biotech
nologyFAQs.xml&navid=AGRICULTURE (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter USDA FAQs].
9. See Jack Kaskey, Monsanto Won’t Block Generic Seeds as Patents End
(Update3), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aU3lBepsCb68 [hereinafter Monsanto Won’t
Block Generic Seeds]; see also Parloff, supra note 2 (discussing Monsanto competitor Dupont’s claims that “Monsanto is using abusive patent license provisions”).
10. Monsanto Won’t Block Generic Seeds, supra note 9.

10 WELTERS FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/28/2012 12:38 PM

STRIKING A BALANCE

409

This Note outlines current issues surrounding the regulation of generic GMOs and proposes changes to existing USDA
regulations. Part I provides an overview of the current regulatory issues and patent protections used in the agriculture industry that impact the availability of generic GMOs. Part II
briefly compares the agriculture industry to the pharmaceutical
industry and then contemplates how the pharmaceutical industry may be instructive in establishing USDA regulations that
are more effective while ensuring an efficient transition to the
use of generic GMOs. This Note concludes that the USDA
should adopt a regulation similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act to
facilitate the entrance of generic GMOs in the market.
I. OVERVIEW OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS, REGULATIONS, AND PATENT
PROTECTIONS
A. GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
A genetically modified organism is an “organism where the
genetic material is altered unnaturally through fertilization
and/or recombination.”11 An organism’s genetic material is typically altered to confer some benefit—usually economic in nature.12 One variation of a GMO is genetically engineered crops,
which are engineered to provide various benefits to farmers
ranging from weed and insect resistance to enhanced drought
tolerance.13 Monsanto’s RR soybeans are a genetically engineered crop because the company has modified the soybean to
build a tolerance to glyphosate.14 Glyphosate is an active ingre-

11. Debdatta Dobe & Rohini Sen, Genetically Modified Organisms Trade
Route and Biosafety—Is it a Failing Synthesis?, 1 AM. J. OF ECON. & BUS.
ADMIN. 206, 206 (2009), available at http://thescipub.com/html/
10.3844/ajebasp.2009.206.212.
12. See Genetically Modified Food: What are Genetically Modified Foods?,
NAT. HEALTH GUIDE, http://www.natural-health-guide.com/geneticallymodified-food.html, (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
13. See USDA FAQs, supra note 8. The USDA defines genetic engineering
as the “[m]anipulation of an organism’s genes using the methods of modern
molecular biology.” Biotechnology: Glossary of Agricultural Biotechnology
Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usda
home?contentid=BiotechnologyGlosary.xml&navid=AGRICULTURE (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
14. Safety Assessment of Roundup Ready Soybean Event 40-3-2,
MONSANTO (Sept. 2002), http://www.monsanto.com/products/Documents/safety
-summaries/soybean_es.pdf [hereinafter Safety Assessment].
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dient in Monsanto’s Roundup herbicides.15 By engineering the
soybean to have a tolerance to glyphosate, farmers are able to
spray fields with Monsanto’s herbicides without killing the soybeans.16 Moreover, the Roundup herbicide is effective against
several types of weeds and grasses, which allow the farmers to
spray less often.17 Since farmers do not need to spray as often,
Roundup herbicides enable farmers to save money on fertilizer,
implement effective weed management programs, and be more
environmentally friendly.18
B. THE GREAT DEBATE: DO THE BENEFITS OF GMOS OUTWEIGH
THE RISKS?
In addition to the various benefits attributed to Monsanto’s
RR soybeans, there are also several concerns about their use.19
One concern is that RR soybeans build herbicide resistance in
weeds.20 Studies have shown that weed resistance to glyphosate has increased since the introduction of RR crops.21 If the
weeds are less resistant to the Roundup herbicide, more herbicide is required to effectively eradicate the weeds; thus, removing some of the benefits associated with the use of RR soybeans.22
The controversy surrounding the use of RR soybeans is just
one example of the larger debate regarding the use of GMOs in
general.23 The various advantages of GMOs that proponents
point to include: drought tolerance, disease resistance, and pest
15. Id.
16. See Barry A. Palevitz, DNA Surprise: Monsanto Discovers Extra Sequences in its Roundup Ready Soybeans, 14 THE SCIENTIST 20 (2000), available at http://classic.the-scientist.com/article/display/11963.
17. Safety Assessment, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. See Deborah Whitman, Genetically Modified Foods: Harmful or Helpful, CSA DISCOVERY GUIDES, at 5 (Apr. 2000), http://www.csa.com/discovery
guides/gmfood/review.pdf.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Terrance Hurley et al., Effects of Weed-Resistance Concerns and Resistance-Management Practices on the Value of Roundup Ready Crops, 12 J.
AGROBIOTECH. MGMT. & ECON. 291, 291 (2009), available at
http://www.agbioforum.org/v12n34/v12n34a05-mitchell.pdf.
22. See
Monsanto
and
the
Roundup
Ready
Controversy,
SOURCEWATCH.ORG,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Monsanto
_and_the_Roundup_Ready_Controversy (last modified May 13, 2010, 12:30
AM).
23. Whitman, supra note 19, at 1.
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resistance.24 GMOs may also improve nutrition, especially in
developing countries. 25 In addition, scientists are beginning to
modify plants to have pharmaceutical value with the goal of
making medicine more accessible, especially to those in developing countries.26
For all the benefits associated with the use of GMOs, critics point out that there are also downsides.27 Critics of GMOs
cannot be easily categorized—ranging from members of religious organizations and environmental activists to scientists
and government officials.28 These critics claim the potential
risks and drawbacks to GMOs outweigh the potential benefits.29 In addition to environmental concerns, such as transferring genes to unintended species, there are also human health
risks and economic concerns.30 One persistent health concern is
that the use of GMOs may create new allergies or that a gene
introduced in a plant may cause an allergic reaction.31 For example, many Americans have an allergy to peanuts. If a scientist introduces a gene from a peanut into soybeans, the gene
may cause an allergic reaction in an unsuspecting person.32
One economic concern regarding GMOs is the potential to
marginalize the poor.33 GMOs require extensive research and
development before they may be commercialized.34 As a result,
companies seek protective patents on their products in order to
recoup their initial investments.35 However, critics worry that
the protective patents will allow companies to raise prices so
high that developing countries and smaller farmers will be unable to purchase the seeds and benefit from them, “thus widen-

24. Id. at 2–4.
25. Id. at 3. For example, some developing countries rely on rice for food,
but rice by itself contains small amounts of nutritional value. Therefore, if the
rice can be modified to add vitamins and minerals, it could ameliorate the
malnutrition problem in some developing countries. Id.
26. Id.
27. See generally id. (outlining several positive and negative aspects associated with the use of GMOs).
28. Id. at 5.
29. E.g., Genetically Modified Food, supra note 12.
30. Whitman, supra note19, at 7–8.
31. Id. at 7.
32. See, e.g., id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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ing the gap between the wealthy and the poor.”36
The debate surrounding the use of GMOs is not limited to
the United States.37 Countries around the world are divided on
the use of GMOs.38 The international dispute over GMOs involves issues such as the “technical aspects of GMOs and their
international impacts” as well as “consumer education related
to GMOs.” 39
C. REGULATING GMOS
1. Food Safety in the United States: A Coordinated Framework
The U.S. Government places the responsibility of policing
GMOs with three primary agencies: the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and the USDA.40 The agency that regulates a specific GMO depends on the intended use of the product.41 The FDA generally
regulates foods in interstate commerce that are eaten by animals or humans, such as a bowl of cornflakes.42 Meanwhile, the
EPA determines the environmental risks of pesticides and genetically engineered plants containing altered pesticide properties.43 The EPA conducts risk assessments on pesticides that
pose a potential harm to humans or the environment. There are
strict guidelines regarding the amount of pesticides that may
be present while the crop is growing, in addition to the level of
pesticide retained in the food. Farmers must ensure they are

36. Id.
37. See Dobe & Sen, supra note 11, at 208.
38. Id. Countries like Japan, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan are more
reluctant to use GMOs than the United States. Id. Some of this reluctance
may stem from mistrust in governmental regulatory oversight for food. See id.
For example, in the United Kingdom, part of this mistrust arguably arises
from recent food scares. Sally Eden, et al., The Sceptical Consumer? Exploring
Views About Food Assurance, 33 FOOD POL’Y 624, 624 (2008).
39. Dobe & Sen, supra note 11, at 208.
40. USDA FAQs, supra note 13.
41. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302, 23,304 (June 26, 1986) (“Jurisdiction over the varied biotechnology
products is determined by their use . . . .”); USDA FAQs, supra note 13.
42. Whitman, supra note 19 (noting that the FDA regulates cornflakes
because it is considered a “food product” and not a “whole food”); see also Alan
McHughen, Plant Genetic Engineering and Regulation in the United States,
UNIV. OF CAL. DIVISION OF AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES, at 3,
http://ucanr.org/freepubs/docs/8179.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
43. McHughen, supra note 42, at 3.
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adhering to the EPA’s safety standards.44
The USDA—the third agency in the coordinated framework—assesses how safe it is to grow the genetically engineered plant.45 For example, while the FDA regulates cornflakes, the USDA regulates the corn that was a raw material in
producing the cornflakes.46 The USDA monitors for various environmental problems, such as insects developing resistance to
certain genetically engineered crops, and conducts studies to
determine the relative safety of genetically engineered plants,
animals, and microorganisms.47 Specifically, the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) division is
responsible for ensuring that U.S. crops are free of pests and
disease.48
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans are regulated by
both the USDA and the EPA. Soybeans are like corn in that
they are considered a “whole food,” so the USDA is responsible
for ensuring that the modified soybean plant is safe to grow
and will not adversely affect other agriculture and the environment.49 The EPA is responsible for assessing whether the
RR soybean crops are safe to use.50
2. The Inner-Workings of Current and Proposed USDA
Regulations
The USDA derives its regulatory power over GMOs—like
RR soybeans—from the Plant Protection Act (PPA).51 The PPA

44. See Whitman, supra note 19, at 10 (“The USDA is concerned with potential hazards of the plant itself. Does it harbor insects? Is it a noxious weed?
Will it cause harm to indigenous species . . . ?).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. USDA FAQs, supra note 13.
49. See McHughen, supra note 42, at 3; Whittman, supra note 19; see, e.g.,
Soybean
Deregulation,
Louise
Prance,
USDA
Grants
New
(Aug.
6,
2007),
http://www.foodnavigatorFOODNAVIGATOR.COM
usa.com/Regulation/USDA-grants-new-soybean-deregulation (noting that the
USDA regulates Monsanto’s RR soybeans).
50. Maggie
Delano,
Key
Players,
ROUNDUP
READY
CROPS,
http://web.mit.edu/demoscience/Monsanto/players.html (last visited Aug. 28,
2011).
51. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7711 (2006). Prior to the enactment of
the PPA in 2000, APHIS derived its regulatory power from two acts: the Plant
Quarantine Act (PQA) and the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA). Gregory N.
Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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grants the USDA the authority to “prohibit or restrict . . . any
plant . . . if [the Secretary of Agriculture] determines that the
prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent . . . the dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed within the United
States.”52 The PPA defines “plant pest” broadly, which results
in the USDA having the authority to regulate GMOs.53 The
USDA then delegates to APHIS the task of ensuring compliance with the PPA.54
The PPA requires developers of a GMO to first evaluate
the risk of the plant, and then follow either a notification or
permit process.55 The goal of both processes is to prevent the
escape of harmful GMOs into the environment.56 The notification process, however, is shorter and simpler than the permit
process.57
A developer can follow the notification process so long as it
meets the following six standards: (1) the plant is not a “noxious weed”; (2) the genetic material is “stably integrated”; (3)
the function of the genetic material is known and will not result
in plant disease; (4) the genetic material does not cause “production of an infection entity,” encode substances that will “be
toxic to non-target organisms,” or “encode products intended for
pharmaceutical or industrial use”; (5) plant virus-derived genetic material must be “noncoding regulatory sequences of
known function, or . . . prevalent and endemic in the area
where introduction will occur”; and (6) the plant cannot be modified to contain certain “genetic material[s] from animal or human pathogens.” 58
2167, 2224 (2004).
52. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a) (2006).
53. See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2010) (defining “plant pests” as “[a]ny living
stage of . . . invertebrate animals, bacteria, fungi, other parasitic plants . . . or
any infectious agents or substances, which can directly or indirectly injure or
cause disease or damage in or to any plants . . . or any processed, manufactured, or other products of plants”).
54. See Mandel, supra note 51, at 2224.
55. Id. at 2225.
56. Id. at 2225–26.
57. See id. at 2226. “Nearly 99% of all field tests, importations, and interstate movement of genetically engineered plants take place under the notification system.” Id.
58. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b)(1)–(6). If the six standards are met then the developer needs to only mail notification to APHIS with contact information for the
developer, identifying information for the “regulated article,” the location of
where the environmental release will take place, the date of the release, and a
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If, however, the GMO is unable to meet all six criteria then
the developer must follow the longer permit process.59 Two versions of the permit application must be submitted.60 The first
copy should contain confidential information and trade secrets,
but those pages containing this information should be marked
“CBI copy,”61 and the second copy of the application should
have the confidential information redacted with “CBI deleted”
on those pages.62 Additionally, developers can ask that their
genetically engineered plant be granted “nonregulated status.”63 The developer must prepare a complete statement supporting why the GMO should be granted non-regulatory status.64 Moreover, APHIS must prepare a detailed environmental
impact statement (EIS) when it takes “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”65
If the GMO will not have a substantial environmental impact,
the shorter environmental assessment (EA) suffices.66 Typically
only one APHIS employee determines whether the notification
process is sufficient to approve the genetically engineered plant
without any public or scientific expert comment.67 Further—as
currently applied—once a plant has been granted nonregulated status, the plant’s status is “absolute” and the agency
will not have “further oversight of the plant or its progeny and
descendants.”68
APHIS is currently in the process of revising its regulations for GMOs.69 The goal of the revisions is to improve trans-

statement certifying that the six standards are met. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(d).
59. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(e). The permit application must be filed at least 120
days before the contemplated release of the plant as compared to only 30 days
under the notification process. 7 C.F.R. § 340.4(b).
60. 7 C.F.R. § 340.4(a).
61. CBI stands for “confidential business information.” Id.
62. Id.
63. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(a).
64. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(b). The developer must “include copies of scientific
literature, copies of unpublished studies . . . and data from tests performed . . . .”
Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2006).
66. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2010).
67. COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS ASSOC. WITH COMMERCIALIZATION OF
TRANSGENIC PLANTS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC
PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION 9 (2002), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10258&page=1.
68. Id. at 10.
69. See Proposed Revisions to APHIS Regulation of Genetically Engineered
Organisms, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/

10 WELTERS FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

416

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/28/2012 12:38 PM

[Vol. 13:1

parency, eliminate unnecessary regulations, and enhance clarity of regulations.70 Under the proposed regulations, the notification process would be removed71 and replaced with three
types of permits: interstate movement, importation, and environmental release.72 Permits for an environmental release
would include a multiple category system.73 The categories
would be based on the risk associated with the genetically engineered plant as well as the ability of the unmodified version
of the plant to survive with the introduction of the modified
plant.74 The proposed regulations would purportedly clarify the
process and standard used to determine approval for
nonregulated status.75 Further, a procedure may be included
that allows APHIS to revoke nonregulated status.76 Those genetically engineered plants currently non-regulated will be
grandfathered in and continue to have such status.77
Changes to the regulations, however, have been slow in
coming.78 In July 2007, APHIS issued a Draft Environmental
Issue Statement summarizing the issues APHIS was contemplating while making the changes.79 One of the significant
340/340_index.shtml (last modified Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Revisions to APHIS].
70. See Transcript of a Media Call on the Proposed Regulatory Revisions,
FTS-USDA-APHIS (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
newsroom/content/2008/10/content/printable/brs_transcript_340_10608.pdf
[hereinafter Transcript of a Media Call].
71. Questions and Answers: Proposed Revisions to Biotechnology Regulations, USDA-APHIS (Oct. 2008), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/bio
technology/content/printable_version/faq_brs340.pdf [hereinafter Questions
and Answers].
72. Martha E. Marrapese, USDA APHIS Proposes Amendments to Regulations Regarding Genetically Engineered Organisms, MARTINDALE.COM (July
31, 2009), http://www.martindale.com/technology-science-law/article_KellerHeckman-LLP_763758.htm.
73. Questions and Answers, supra note 71.
74. Marrapese, supra note 72. All other genetically engineered organisms
besides genetically engineered plants “would be placed into a single category
and reviewed on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Proposed Revisions to APHIS, supra note 69 (showing that changes to the USDA regulations for biotechnology were first considered in 2007,
but no revisions have been forthcoming since the public comment period ended
mid-2009).
79. Lessons Learned and Revisions Under Consideration APHIS’ Biotechnology Framework, USDA 1, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/
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changes proposed is replacing the current notification system
with the previously discussed multi-permit system.80 The proposed revisions were open for public comment on October 9,
2008 and reopened for public comment on January 16, 2009,
which was extended until June 29, 2009.81 Since the end of the
comment period in June 2009, APHIS has not made further
publications to indicate the strides it is making with the revisions.82 Noticeably absent in USDA regulations, as well as in
the proposed revisions, is the procedure for regulating generic
GMOs.83
3. Current USDA Regulations Leave Much To Be Desired
Despite the USDA’s attempts to effectively regulate genetically engineered crops, problems still exist. First, the
USDA’s current GMO regulations are inadequate for effective
regulation.84 The PPA only covers those GMOs classified as
“plant pests.”85 As a result, the PPA does not cover those organisms that are beneficial to plants, nor nonparasitic plants, nor
vertebrate animals.86 Therefore, many biological species remain
unregulated, even though environmental risks may exist.87
Second, recent cases demonstrate that APHIS has not dili2007/10/content/printable/LessonsLearned10-2007.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2011). The purpose of the Draft Environmental Issue Statement is to assess
the environmental impact proposed changes would have. Proposed Revisions to
APHIS, supra note 69.
80. See Transcript of a Media Call, supra note 70.
81. Proposed Revisions to APHIS, supra note 69.
82. Id.
83. See Parloff, supra note 2 (noting that there is a “legislative void” in
transitioning products from patented protection to generic competition).
84. William Allen, The Current Federal Regulatory Framework for Release
of Genetically Altered Organisms into the Environment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 531,
545 (1990).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. For example, the FDA, rather than the USDA, determines whether
genetically modified salmon should be approved for human consumption. Kim
Carollo, Surprise: FDA Panel Unable to Reach Conclusion on Genetically Modified Salmon, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
Health/WellnessNews/fda-unable-reach-conclusion-genetically-modifiedsalmon/story?id=11682586. While the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act
may be seen as giving the FDA regulatory authority over animals, like salmon,
its authority has not been clearly established. Guides to U.S. Regulation of
Genetically Modified Food and Agricultural Biotechnology Products, PEW
INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECH. 22, available at http://www.pewtrusts.org
/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/hhs_biotec
h_0901.pdf.
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gently followed the procedures required by the PPA.88 For example, the USDA has failed to prepare an EIS in several instances.89 In 2005, APHIS deregulated RR alfalfa but failed to
first prepare an EIS, allegedly in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(c).90 Even though APHIS received over 500 comments
opposing the deregulation of RR alfalfa and despite APHIS’s
own internal documents warning that contamination could occur, APHIS still granted RR alfalfa deregulated status.91
APHIS again failed to complete an EIS before deregulating
genetically engineered sugar beets.92 The California District
Court ruled that APHIS violated the law by not first preparing
an EIS and prohibited future plantings of genetically engineered sugar beets until an EIS was prepared.93
C. PREVENTING GENERIC COMPETITION THROUGH GMO
PATENTS
Even though Monsanto has announced that it will not impede manufacturers from making a generic version of the RR
soybean once its patent expires in 2014,94 farmers and Monsanto’s competitors still worry that the company will use various
tactics to prevent the market entrance of a generic version.95
Some of this fear stems from hard-line tactics Monsanto has
previously used to protect its RR soybean patents as well as
from concerns regarding the recent development of its Roundup
Ready 2 (RR2) soybean.
88. Deniza Gertsberg, Internal Reports Finds USDA’s Failure to EffectiveJ.
(Jan.
28,
2010),
http://gmoly
Regulate
GMOs,
GMO
journal.com/index.php/2010/01/28/internal-report-finds-usdas-failure-toeffectively-regulate-gmos. A 2005 Inspector General report found that the
USDA at times was unaware of the specific location where a GMO was to be
planted; the agency failed to adequately document its reasons for approving
“initial field test applications” and the agency did not always require a report
of what was to be done with the GM crops after the trial was complete. Id.
89. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2758
(2010).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2762–63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
93. Id. at 952–53.
94. Kaskey, supra note 6; see Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/roundup-readyMONSANTO,
patent-expiration.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
95. Kaskey, supra note 6.
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One significant way Monsanto defends its RR soybean patent is by prohibiting farmers from saving the seeds of RR soybeans. A farmer that purchases RR soybeans is required to sign
a written document agreeing not to save or replant seeds produced from a grown RR soybean plant.96 Monsanto’s rationale
behind the prohibition is that a farmer has not paid for the
soybeans featuring Monsanto technology if they are grown from
the saved seeds.97 Accordingly, Monsanto has sued farmers who
have violated the agreement.98 Farmers meanwhile have criticized Monsanto for employing this tactic.99
Even though farmers will be able to save and replant seeds
grown from their own crop once the RR soybean patent expires
in 2014, farmers still fear that Monsanto’s introduction of the
RR2 soybean is another tactic the company will use to impede
the development of a generic version of the soybean.100 It is
feared that in an effort to induce the market to adopt the RR2
soybeans, Monsanto could force farmers to begin purchasing
the new RR2 variety before a generic version of the older RR
soybean is widely adopted.101 As a result, the generic RR soybean, set to go off patent in 2014, would no longer be as desirable and there would be less incentive for generic manufacturers
to duplicate the RR soybean.102
The concerns regarding the forced adoption of a similar
GMO and aggressive patent protections are just two examples
of tactics used by companies to protect their patented products.103 Critics believe, however, that these tactics lead to higher prices and limit the public’s ability to purchase and benefit
96. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmerswho-save-seeds.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
97. See id.
98. Id. Between 1997 and April 2010, Monsanto filed lawsuits against 144
farmers. Id.
99. Monsanto Won’t Block Generic Seeds, supra note 9 (“Farmers criticized
Monsanto in the 2008 documentary ‘Food Inc.’ for its contracts to keep them
from saving seeds after a harvest.”). The criticisms have included suing farmers at all for having saved seeds, “suing a small farmer for cleaning seeds,”
and fear of suing farmers for genetically engineered crops that blew into a
farmer’s field. Food, Inc. Movie, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/foodinc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
100. See Monsanto and the Roundup Ready Controversy, supra note 22.
101. Michael Stumo, Anticompetitive Tactics in Ag Biotech Could Stifle Entrance of Generic Traits, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 137, 140–41 (2010).
102. See id. at 142.
103. See Stumo, supra note 101, at 140−43.
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from genetically engineered crops.104
D. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The entrance of generics into the market will magnify the
problems currently seen with respect to GMOs—inadequate
and ineffective administration of current GMO regulations as
well as the hard-line patent protection policies used by name
brand companies.105 The lower prices from the sale of generics
will likely result in increased demand.106 If demand increases,
the negative health and environmental effects will be exacerbated as more people use GMOs.107 In addition, name brand
companies will engage in more tactics to protect their patents
and maintain their market share.108 On the other hand, there
are various benefits associated with the use of GMOs, and the
use of generic GMOs will also lead to more people realizing
104. See Kaskey, supra note 6; see also Whitman, supra note 19, at 7
(“[C]onsumer advocates are worried that patenting these new plant varieties
will raise the price of seeds so high that small farmers and third world countries will not be able to afford seeds from GM crops . . . .”).
105. See supra notes 94−104 and accompanying text.
106. Cf. Economics Basics: Demand and Supply, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics3.asp (last visited
Aug. 28, 2011). The pharmaceutical industry, for example, has seen the effect
that lower prices have on demand. The decreased pricing associated with generics is caused by the influx of generic brands hitting the market after the
expiration of a patent. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED
COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 28 (1998). As a result, the different competitors try to differentiate themselves by dropping prices to incentivize consumers to purchase their version of a drug. Id. at 32. The manufacturers of generic
drugs are able to set lower prices because they do not have the initial investment costs of brand-name manufacturers. Cf. id. at 14–16 (explaining the
costs incurred by drug manufacturers during new drug development). A Federal Trade Commission report found that after a pharmaceutical drug’s patent
expires and two generic companies begin immediately selling a generic version
of the drug, the price is 6.5% lower on average as compared to only 4.5% lower
on average if only one generic manufacturer enters the market. Daniel B.
Moskowitz, FTC: Authorized Generics Lead to Lower Prices, DRUG BENEFIT
TRENDS (Aug. 1, 2009), http://dbt.consultantlive.com/generics/content/article
/1145628/1465515. Moreover, even Monsanto recognizes that a benefit of generic RR soybeans is the increased availability of the technology to the public.
Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, supra note 94.
107. “Farmers and seed companies, having paid dearly for Roundup
Ready’s benefits throughout its patent life, are now eager to begin enjoying
their half of the patent bargain—the point when Monsanto’s legal monopoly
expires and Roundup Ready enters the public domain.” Parloff, supra note 2.
108. Stumo, supra note 101, at 140.
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these advantages.109 One of the possible advantages of a generic RR soybean is the possibility that it might address the economic concerns of small farmers who are unable to afford genetically engineered crops such as RR soybeans.110 With the
entrance of generic genetically engineered crops into the market and the resulting lower prices, more farmers will be able to
afford the technology.111
Given the magnification of advantages that may result
from the increased availability of generic GMOs, the USDAAPHIS should revise its regulations to facilitate the market entrance of generic GMOs in order to realize the various benefits
from their use. With any increase in the use of GMOs the disadvantages attributed to their use will also be magnified, so
regulatory oversight of generic GMOs is still necessary in order
to limit these concerns.
II. ANALYSIS
While the USDA-APHIS is currently revising its regulations for GMOs, we should also consider striking a proper balance between ensuring that generic GMOs are safe, spurring
innovation, and promoting competition. To help strike the
proper balance, the USDA can look to the pharmaceutical industry and the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act is
a useful regulatory structure that supports the entrance of generic drugs while protecting name brand companies that originally developed the drugs. In addition, the recently passed
Biosimilar Act further supports the adoption of an act similar
to the Hatch-Waxman Act by the agriculture industry.
A. AN INDUSTRY COMPARISON
The agriculture industry and pharmaceutical industry are
similar in various ways. First, both industries require significant initial costs in development, either of a genetically engineered crop or a new drug, and then in bringing the new product to market. Monsanto has stated that it typically takes an
109. Whitman, supra note 19, at 2–4 (listing the potential benefits of
GMOs). If the disadvantages of using generic GMOs are magnified as more
people gain access to the technology, there should also be an increase in the
benefits associated with the use of GMOs as well. See generally id. at 7–8 (explaining that small farmers do not have the financial ability to take advantage
of GMOs).
110. See generally id. at 7–8.
111. See id. at 7.
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average of ten years and $100 million to bring a new product to
market,112 and the Congressional Budget Office notes that
pharmaceutical companies can spend more than $800 million to
develop an innovative pharmaceutical drug.113 Second, each industry utilizes mergers and acquisitions to reduce costs, augment product offerings, and increase the number of patents.114
In the agriculture industry, there has been an upward trend in
mergers and acquisitions since the late 1990s115 and “by 2002,
95[%] of patents originally held by seed or small ag-biotech
firms had been acquired by large chemical or multinational
corporations.”116 The pharmaceutical industry has also had
numerous restructurings through mergers and acquisitions resulting in the ten largest companies accounting for approximately fifty percent of worldwide sales in 2002 as compared to
only twelve percent in 1987.
Third, besides using acquisitions to offset the substantial
investment costs, both industries have utilized various patent
protections to protect their investments. One of agriculture industry’s largest firms—Monsanto—has employed patent pro-

112. Jeffrey Tomich, Monsanto Growth Falters as SmartStax Yields, Pricing Raise Questions, STLTODAY.COM (Oct. 6, 2010, 12:05 AM),
http://www.stltoday.com/business/article_b0c5044b-c54d-5a84-a92a042b3f7ef7da.html; see also Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save
Seeds?, supra note 96 (“[Monsanto] currently invest[s] over $2.6 million per
day to develop and bring new products to market.”).
113. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D. However, there is
research suggesting that the $800 million research and development estimate
is too low and that the cost actually is closer to $1 billion. Cost of Drug Development: $1 Billion, HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://healthcare-economist.com/2010/02/16/cost-of-drug-development-1-billion
(citing Christopher Paul Adams & Van Vu Brantner, Spending on New Drug
Development, 19 HEALTH ECON. 130,138 (2010)).
114. See Margaret Brennan, et. al., An Innovation Market Approach to Analyzing Impacts of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Plant Biotechnology Industry, 8 J. AGROBIOTECH. MGMT. & ECON. 2&3, 89, 89 (2005), available at
http://agbioforum.org/v8n23/v8n23a05-pray.pdfhttp://agbioforum.org/v8n23
/v8n23a05-pray.htm; Natasha Singer & Duff Wilson, Drug Firms Dreaming of
TIMES,
Feb.
25,
2009,
at
B1,
available
at
Deals,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/business/25place.html?_r=1&ref=busines.
115. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., TRACKING THE
TREND TOWARDS MARKET CONCENTRATION: THE CASE OF THE AGRICULTURAL
INPUT
26
(2006)
[hereinafter
UNCTAD],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditccom200516_en.pdf.
116. Id. at 26.
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tections ranging from refusing to allow farmers to save seeds to
allegedly contemplating requiring farmers to purchase its new
RR2 soybean, while discontinuing the original version of its RR
soybean. Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry has been criticized for “product hopping,” where a pharmaceutical company
switches the formulation of its patented drug and removes the
“old version” as soon as the generic company files its Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which forces the generic
company to either start the regulatory procedures over or refrain from entering the market for that drug.117
B. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a viable regulatory framework
for the agricultural industry. The similarities between the
pharmaceutical and agriculture industries118 and the effectiveness of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the pharmaceutical industry,119 suggest that use of such a framework would be successful. Specifically, Hatch-Waxman is instructive on how to
structure regulation for the entrance of generic GMOs into the
market while still protecting the investments companies made
in developing the name brand GMOs.
1. The Inner Workings of the Hatch-Waxman Act
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), new drugs must be shown to be safe before they may
be sold.120 Meanwhile, drug research and development is a
risky venture because development requires much investment
with low rates of success.121As a result, name brand drug manufacturers rely on patents to recoup their investments in developing the drug. Before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, name brand pharmaceutical companies lobbied for a more
117. Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context,
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 631, 657–58.
118. See supra notes 112–117 and accompanying text.
119. Aaron F. Barkoff, Patent Litigation Under a Future Biosimilars Act, 6
SNIPPETS 1, 1 (May 2008), available at http://www.mbhb.com/resources/doc
uments/Snippets_Vol_6_Issue_1.pdf.
120. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006); FDA, A HISTORY OF THE FDA AND DRUG
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
2
(n.d.),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsi
ngMedicineSafely/UnderstandingOver-the-CounterMedicines/ucm093550.pdf.
121. James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 449 (1986).
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efficient approval process to receive greater benefit from their
patents because the longer review periods reduced the effective
length of patent protection.122 In addition, generic drug companies claimed that requiring “generic equivalents” to undergo
the same lengthy process required of name brand manufacturers “unfairly delayed drug price competition.”123
Responding to claims from both name brand and generic
drug manufacturers,124 Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known
as the Hatch-Waxman Act.125 The Act first allowed pharmaceutical companies to apply for a patent extension of up to five
years if the patent life was less than fourteen years after FDA
approval.126 The Act also provided for an ANDA. An ANDA is
“abbreviated” because preclinical and clinical trials are not typically required for FDA approval of the drug.127 Instead, the generic manufacturer must only prove that the generic drug is
bio-equivalent to the name brand one.128
When a generic manufacturer applies for an ANDA, the
manufacturer must certify that to the best of its knowledge it
meets one of four paragraph certifications as related to the
listed drug—(I) no patent exists that covers the product; (II) the
patent has expired; (III) the generic manufacturer will not seek
FDA approval until the patent expires; or (IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed if the generic drug company produces the drug.129

122. Id. at 435.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2006)).
126. Wheaton, supra note 121, at 435.
127. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsare
developedandapproved/approvalapplications/abbreviatednewdrugapplication
andagenerics/default.htm (last updated Mar. 21, 2011).
128. Id. Bioequivalence means that the generic drug performs in the same
way as the name brand drug. Id. Bioequivalence is shown by measuring the
time it takes the generic drug to reach the blood stream. The resulting absorption rate is known as the bioavailability of the generic drug. Id. “The generic
version must deliver the same amount of active ingredients into a patient’s
bloodstream in the same amount of time as the innovator drug.” Id.
129. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act §
101(2)(A)(vii)(I)−(IV).
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If, however, the patent holder does not bring a lawsuit
within forty-five days of notice, the FDA may approve the
ANDA and/or the generic manufacturer can sue.130 In addition,
the generic manufacturer(s) that first file(s) an application with
a paragraph IV certification will receive 180-days of market exclusivity beginning the “date of first commercial marketing.”131
The 180-day market exclusivity period, however, may be forfeited in various ways, including the “fail[ure] to market the
drug within seventy-five days of approval or within thirtymonths after submission of the ANDA.”132
2. Applying the Hatch-Waxman Act in the Agriculture Industry
As discussed earlier in this Note, the agriculture industry
is similar to the pharmaceutical industry in several ways, including substantial investment costs.133 Given the high investment costs, it is important to ensure that the manufacturers of
name brand GMOs, like Monsanto, continue to be incentivized
to develop novel products. Therefore, patent protection is necessary. The agriculture industry appears to be facing the same
concerns the pharmaceutical industry faced prior to enactment
of the Hatch-Waxman Act: name brand manufacturers wanted
reduced review periods to effectively lengthen the patent period, while generic manufacturers wanted a shortened review
process when producing a generic equivalent. However, the
need for patent protection must be balanced against the need
for additional competition in the form of generic GMOs. The
Hatch-Waxman Act is instrumental in accomplishing both
these goals.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides access to data, and in return the name brand company receives patent protection. The
Act, as applied to the agriculture industry, could work much
like it does in the pharmaceutical industry. Under the Act,
name brand manufacturers could extend the patent life depending upon the years remaining on the patent after USDA

130. Id. at 614. The 180-day market exclusivity period provides that the
FDA may not approve ANDAs for the same drug by other generic manufacturers. Id.
131. Id. at 619.
132. D. Christopher Ohly, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Prescriptions for Innovative and Inexpensive Medicines, SCHIFFHARDIN LLP, at 18 (Spring 2010),
http://www.schiffhardin.com/binary/ohly-Hatch_Waxman_Prescriptions42010.pdf.
133. See supra notes 112−117 and accompanying text.
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approval, while generic manufacturers could follow an abbreviated application process if able to show generic equivalence to
the name brand version of the crop.
When it comes to generic versions of genetically engineered
crops, there are two access points from which a “generic” version of the seed may be obtained: (1) by purchasing seed from a
generic manufacturer or (2) reusing seed from a previously
grown RR soybean plant.134 With respect to access point (1)—
purchasing seeds from a generic manufacturer—an act similar
to the Hatch-Waxman Act is important in ensuring that data is
available to produce a generic version of the RR soybean. Due
to current regulations, a generic manufacturer will need proprietary information from Monsanto to receive federal approval
and the technical data needed to update licenses in areas like
the European Union (EU) and China,135 where regulations tend
to be stricter.136 If the agriculture industry adopted an act similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer could
develop a generic version based on the data provided in Monsanto’s patent and receive USDA approval through an abbreviated process. The generic manufacturer would only need to
show that the generic RR soybean is equivalent to the name
brand soybean.137 In addition, an act like the Hatch-Waxman
Act would allow generic manufacturers to begin developing generic versions sooner and also receive the benefit of an exclusivity period.138
134. See Parloff, supra note 2.
135. Frank Morris, Monsanto GMO Ignites Big Seed War, NPR (Jan. 12,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122498255.
136. Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and
the United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. OF EUR. L.
525, 537−38 (1998) (explaining that the EU requires not only governmental
approval (similar to the FDA and USDA in the U.S.) but also Member State
approval of GMOs, while the U.S. requires no special approval); see Dobe &
Sen, supra note 11, at 208 (noting that China has published comprehensive
new laws).
137. The way in which equivalence between the generic product and name
brand one is determined is outside the scope of this Note. However, equivalence should be established to show that the generic GMO performs in the
same way as the name brand one and is not a “plant pest or noxious weed”—in
that the generic version does not violate the Plant Protection Act. 7 U.S.C.A. §
7712(a) (West 2010).
138. Currently, a generic manufacturer in the agriculture industry must
wait until the patent expires to begin producing a generic version, which can
result in the loss of market appeal for the generic product. For example, Pioneer explains that areas like the EU and China require regulatory approval
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Monsanto claims that a regulation like Hatch-Waxman Act
is unnecessary because through access point (2)—reusing
seeds—the farmer is able to grow the RR soybean without having to purchase a generic version;139 therefore, a specific act facilitating approval of generic GMOs is unnecessary. While
farmers may realize the benefit of RR soybeans by simply savings seeds, most farmers will not want to do so due as the
“quality of its ‘germplasm,’” or the quality of the plants genetic
material, is reduced, thus adversely affecting the crop yield.140
Developers work to improve the germplasm of seeds through
breeding, which can improve crop yields.141 However, when a
farmer reuses seeds from a previously grown plant, he will not
receive these benefits.142 It is thus in the farmer’s best interest
not to reuse seeds, but to purchase those that continually have
higher quality germplasm. In addition, while a farmer may be
able to reuse his seeds and continue planting RR soybeans, he
will be unable to “stack”143 the RR soybean with any other trait,
such as drought resistance. The RR soybean has only one benefit—herbicide resistance144—so the farmer will forego any additional benefits that could be paired with the RR trait if the
farmer relies solely on saved seeds.
Adopting a version of the Hatch-Waxman Act is an effective way to ensure market competition while still protecting a
name brand company’s patent. Legislation similar to the
Hatch-Waxman Act would allow companies like Monsanto to
extend the length of their patent up to five additional years if

before genetically engineered soybeans will be imported; however, it can take
years for a generic manufacturer to complete and submit the required data for
approval in these countries. Comments of DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred International Regarding Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issues in Our 21st
Century, JUSTICE.GOV, at 18, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops
/ag2010/comments/254990.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
139. Parloff, supra note 2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. A germplasm developer could use the seeds from a RR soybean
plant when the patent is up in 2014, but DuPont claims that Monsanto is incentivizing germplasm developers to “drop[ ] their Roundup Ready 1 seed
lines . . . .” Id.
143. “Stacking” refers to when more than one gene is inserted into a plant
in order to obtain certain characteristics, such as weed control or insect reMONSANTO,
sistance.
Sorting
Out
the
Facts
Behind
Stacks,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/gene-stacks-facts.aspx#q1
(last
visited Aug. 28, 2011).
144. Parloff, supra note 2.

10 WELTERS FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

428

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/28/2012 12:38 PM

[Vol. 13:1

the time remaining on the patent after regulatory approval is
less than fourteen years. This ensures that the company still
has time remaining on its patent to recoup its investment.
Moreover, the name brand manufacturer still receives protection in the face of litigation—in cases where the manufacturer
is contesting an application filed with a paragraph IV certification—because the name brand manufacturer can receive one
thirty-month stay.
Critics of the Hatch-Waxman Act claim the Act burdens
the judiciary with patent disputes. The 180-day market exclusivity period encourages generic manufacturers to file ANDAs,
while the thirty-month stay encourages name brand manufacturers to file lawsuits opposing ANDAs.145 Nonetheless, the
changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act following the Medicare Prescription Drug and Improvement Act of 2003 are helpful in limiting the amount of litigation. The Medicare Prescription Drug
and Improvement Act of 2003 amended the 180-day market exclusivity period in that it may be forfeited by the generic manufacturer,146 thereby limiting the number of generic manufacturers benefiting from the 180-day exclusivity period. On the other
hand, those generic manufacturers that do benefit from the
market exclusivity period must bring the product to market
within a certain timeframe, thus promoting competition and
reduced pricing. In addition, the Medicare Prescription Drug
and Improvement Act of 2003 provides for only one thirtymonth stay for a name brand manufacturer, so there is less incentive for the manufacturer to continue filing lawsuits for the
same product.147 One lawsuit in response to an ANDA filed will
suffice in triggering the thirty-month stay. As a result, there is
less incentive to bring numerous lawsuits.
Despite these criticisms, the Hatch-Waxman Act is shown
to be effective. The overall sale of pharmaceuticals has increased, and the average price of a prescription has fallen as

145. Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 602, 615 (2005).
146. Ohly, supra note 132, at 18. For example, a generic manufacturer will
forfeit the 180-day market exclusivity period if it “fails to market the drug
within 75 days of approval or within 30 months after submission of the
ANDA.” Id.
147. Id.
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more generic manufacturers enter the market.148 The HatchWaxman Act is considered to have encouraged innovation while
“facilitat[ing] the growth of a robust generic pharmaceutical
manufacturing industry, both in the US and around the
globe.”149 With Hatch-Waxman’s success in lowering prescription prices through generic competition and increasing public
access to drugs, the Act is a good foundation on which to base
the regulation of generic GMOs.
C. THE BIOSIMILAR ACT
The Hatch-Waxman Act is an effective structure for setting
up a regulation that allows for generic GMOs to enter the market without having to go through repetitious testing—thus delaying market entry—while protecting companies that spent
millions of dollars on developing the product. The recently
passed Biosimilar Act expands on the Hatch-Waxman Act150
and further supports that a regulatory structure like HatchWaxman is appropriate for the agriculture industry and regulation of generic GMOs.
1. The Inner-Workings of the Biosimilar Act
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009 (the Biosimilar Act) was passed in March 2010151 with the
purpose of lowering prices via increased competition as a result
of a more efficient FDA approval process.152 The Biosimilar Act
regulates biologic drugs that are typically created from living
organisms. Biologic drugs are larger and more complex than
traditional small molecule drugs. The Hatch-Waxman Act regulates the traditional—generally chemically-created small mole148. Id. at 28.
149. Id. at 29.
150. The Biosimilars Act includes features similar to the Hatch-Waxman
Act such as abbreviated procedures for approving drugs that are “highly similar” and have “no clinically meaningful differences;” a period of exclusivity for
the name brand manufacturer; and a market exclusivity period for the
biosimilar product manufacturer. See JAMES N. CZABAN, KARIN A. HESSLER &
MATTHEW J. DOWD, BNA PHARMACEUTICAL L. & INDUSTRY REP. PANACEA OR
POISON PILL? MAKING SENSE OF THE NEW BIOSIMILARS LAW 2 (May 28, 2010),
available at http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/BNA_Czaban_
May2010.pdf. Since the Biosimilar Act seems to be a modified extrapolation of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, it further suggests the success of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and the belief that a similar approach would be beneficial with more complex products.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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cule—drugs.153
Under the Biosimilar Act, a drug is considered a biosimilar
of a reference product (i.e., the name brand drug) if the
biosimilar drug is demonstrated to be “highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically
inactive components.”154 In addition, there must be “no clinically meaningful differences between the biologic product and the
reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of
the product.”155 A biologic product may be “interchangeable”
with the reference product if the “biological product may be
substituted for the reference product without the intervention
of the health care provider who prescribed the reference product.”156 To meet the requirements of biosimilarity, the applicant
must submit with its application data from analytical, animal,
and clinical studies supporting a “high similarity” and “no clinically meaningful differences.”157 If a manufacturer is able to
show that the biologic product is a biosimilar of the reference
product, then the approval process is shortened.158
In return for the abbreviated process, the FDA grants
name brand manufacturers an additional period of twelve years
of patent protection.159 During this time, a competitor is unable
to receive approval based on data that was originally collected
by the name brand manufacturer.160 In addition, similar to how
the Hatch-Waxman Act grants the first filer of an ANDA a 180day market exclusivity period, the Biosimilar Act also provides
for an exclusivity period.161
153. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(2)(A) (West 2010).
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(2)(B) (West 2010).
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(3) (West 2010).
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(a)–(c) (West 2010).
158. The approval process is abbreviated because full clinical testing is not
required. ROPES & GREY, CONGRESS AUTHORIZES ABBREVIATED REGULATORY
PATHWAY FOR FDA APPROVAL OF BIOLOGICAL DRUGS, ROPES & GRAY (Mar. 30,
2010), available at http://www.ropesgray.com/healthreformbiosimilars.
159. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 3–4. Compare to the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which only grants a “five-year data exclusivity barrier to the submission of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for generic versions.” Id. at 4.
160. Id. at 3–4.
161. Id. at 4. Under the Biosimilar Act, if a previous biosimilar product is
already determined to be interchangeable with the reference product, then the
FDA is temporarily prevented from approving another biosimilar product. Id.
The exclusivity period depends on various circumstances including whether
there is patent litigation pending or concluded in addition to when the first
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2. The Biosimilar Act and the Agriculture Industry
GMOs and biologic drugs have various similarities including their complexity and substantial development costs for
name brand manufacturers. In addition, some GMOs are also
derived from living organisms.162 Despite these similarities the
agriculture industry should adopt an approach more similar to
the Hatch-Waxman Act than the Biosimilar Act.
First, the application process under the Hatch-Waxman
Act is better suited for the agriculture industry. When an applicant submits an ANDA certifying which of paragraphs (I)
through (IV) are true, the length of the approval process varies.
With the Biosimilar Act, while it is assumed that fewer studies
will be required to demonstrate a biologic drug is biosimilar to,
or interchangeable with, the reference product, this has yet to
be verified.163 Moreover, debates have already ensued regarding the application of the Biosimilar Act.164 Potential issues are
likely to include how similar the proposed product must be to
the reference product, and what it means to be “highly similar”
and to have “no clinically significant difference.” As a result,
the entrance of generic competitors will most likely be slowed.
With respect to the agriculture industry, a standard should be
adopted where if an applicant is able to show equivalence165 between the generic and the name brand GMO, then additional
studies are not required—similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Further, with the current debate surrounding the use of GMOs,
interchangeable product was commercialized. Id. at 4.
162. For example, Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybean, which is glyphosate-tolerant, is derived from inserting a gene encoded from Agrobacterium
tumefaciens CP4, a soil bacterium. GM Crop Database, CENTER FOR ENVTL.
RISK ASSESSMENT, http://cera-gmc.org/index.php?hstIDXCode[]=8&auDate1=
&auDate2=&action=gm_crop_ database&mode=Submit (last visited Aug. 28,
2011).
163. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 3. Moreover, the requirement that an applicant provide analytical, animal, and clinical studies seems to indicate that a
significant amount of data is required to support biosimilarity between the
reference drug and the biologic one. The applicant filing for biosimilarity also
has a higher burden in proving interchangeability under the Biosimilar Act
than under the Hatch-Waxman Act because the FDA must determine that the
risks of diminished efficacy and safety from switching to the biosimilar product are not greater than that of the reference product if there was no switch.
Id.
164. See, e.g., Biosimilars—FDA Speaks for the First Time About Challenges of Biosimilars Act at DIA 2011 in Chicago, FDA LAWYERS BLOG (July 1,
2011),
http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/2011/07/biosimilars--fda-speaks-forfi.html.
165. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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it is better to have a term more readily understandable (i.e.,
“bioequivalent” rather than “highly similar”) when determining
whether the generic GMO should be approved.
Second, the agriculture industry should also adopt a market exclusivity period similar to the shorter exclusivity period
under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides the generic applicant with 180-days (or approximately six
months) market exclusivity when it begins commercially marketing the product.166 In comparison, the Biosimilar Act has an
exclusivity period that varies depending upon the circumstances—ranging from twelve months to forty-two months.167 The
agriculture industry should adopt the shorter 180-day market
exclusivity period because it allows for more competitors to enter the market sooner, thus furthering the goal of increased
competition and decreased pricing.
And third, the Hatch-Waxman Act is considered successful
overall,168 while the newly passed Biosimilar Act is both complex and ill-defined.169 As a result, the courts, Congress, and
the FDA will be busy interpreting various components of the
Act and closing any loopholes.170 Therefore, it is better to base
legislation to be used in the agriculture industry on an act that
has gone through numerous revisions over the past twenty-five
years in an attempt to make improvements rather than new
legislation subject to much reform.
D. FILLING IN THE DETAILS
Both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilar Act are
instructive on the structure of regulation the agriculture industry should adopt. In addition to adopting a standard more similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the agriculture industry needs to
ensure a regulatory provision for establishing that the generic
166. Ohly, supra note 132, at 18.
167. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 4.
168. See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. But see Martha
Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical
Scales
Balanced,
PHARMACY
TIMES
(Aug.
15,
2009),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplem
ent0809/generic-hatchwaxman-0809 (explaining that while the HatchWaxman Act has benefited consumers through increased entry of generic
drugs in the market, the Act is riddled with loopholes and gives rise to various
anticompetitive strategies).
169. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 1.
170. See id.
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GMO is truly the equivalent of the name brand version. A generic GMO must be equivalent to the name brand by performing in the same way as the name brand version and must
maintain conformity with the Plant Protection Act—in that the
generic GMO is not a “plant pest or noxious weed.”171 The proposed revisions to the USDA regulations may be sufficient to
ensure the equivalence of the generic GMO; however, that is
outside the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, a procedure for determining equivalence must be established. If the USDA determines that simply comparing the properties of the generic
GMO and the name brand is insufficient, it should should consider adopting a more thorough approach that conducts various
studies and includes the results in the application process.
In addition, the USDA needs to ensure that its agents are
strictly complying with regulations. As discussed earlier in this
Note, cases have arisen where the agency has not complied
with the regulations for approval of new GMOs. With the introduction of generic GMOs and the magnification it will have
on both the benefits and concerns currently surrounding the
use of GMOs, the regulations for generic GMOs must be strictly
followed.
CONCLUSION
The expiration of the patent for Monsanto’s RR soybeans in
2014 will mark one of the first times in the agriculture industry
that a widely used GMO will soon have a generic version available. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with
the use of GMOs, and the availability of a generic GMO will
magnify both the benefits and risks surrounding use as more
people will have access to a generic GMO due to the lower
price.
Revised regulations are necessary to ensure a proper transition to generic GMOs and to limit the risks associated with
GMOs. The pharmaceutical industry is instructive on how to
handle the entrance of a generic GMO. The Hatch-Waxman Act
is a useful foundation for encouraging generic competition
through a more streamlined approval process, while still ensuring that name brand companies are incentivized to continue
developing innovative GMOs. The recent Biosimilar Act, which
appears to expand on the Hatch-Waxman Act, is helpful in
showing that the Hatch-Waxman Act is a good regulatory
171. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a) (2006).
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framework for more complicated products as well. While both
the Biosimilar and Hatch-Waxman Acts are good regulatory
frameworks to facilitate of market entry by generic GMO manufacturers, a strict regulatory framework is needed to ensure
that the generic GMO is the same as its name brand counterpart.

